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Unacknowledged Sacrifice and the Rituals of European Central Banking 
 
In this article, the approach of the cultural study of law is adopted by taking inspiration from 
two arguments made in Making the Case and adapted to the context of the European Union. 
In particular, I intend to discuss two points. First, I want to test the argument made by Paul 
Kahn about the courts’ charismatic authoritative function. This is not the first time that Kahn 
is putting forward this type of argument (Kahn 2004, 232), but I want to take the opportunity 
to discuss the interpretation of the highest judicial function from a cultural point of view with 
the aim of proposing a partially different reading of the charismatic function, in practice using 
Kahn to go beyond Kahn. Second, I want to extend this methodology to the constitutional 
context of the European Union, where persuasion and charisma play out in different ways, in 
different institutions and, crucially, to different addressees. I will briefly try to sketch out why 
and how the equivalent role played by the Supreme Court in the US seems today to be, in the 
EU, in the hands of the European Central Bank. Yet, the grounds on which the charismatic 
authority of the ECB stand are of a different kind. Persuasion is played out according to a 
different rationality which speaks first to markets and only secondarily to citizens. Under this 
aspect, the ECB does not need to persuade markets and citizens that its decisions are ‘theirs’, 
but – in an output-based logic – that they are effective in preserving the lifestyle associated 
with the common currency. In the conclusions, it will be highlighted that there is no necessary 
nor constitutive link between the sacrificial logic – understood as the potential exposition to 
the possibility of killing and being killed (Kahn 2004, 244) – and the ritualization of normality. 
Actually, the latter can be understood only if an idea of sovereignty as exceptional decision is 
marginalised. Exceptionalism can be defined as the tendency to portray the grounds of a 
constitutional order upon extraordinary acts which cannot be contained nor validated by 
already constituted norms (for a historical excursus, see, among many, Kalyvas 2009). The 
latter is a frequent position adopted not only by Schmittians, but a whole array of other 
authors (e.g., Arendt often seems to imply that a new beginning operates as an exceptional 
moment).  For this reason, in fact, the example of the authority of the central bank shows 
that the problem lies in the undergirding exceptionalist conception of sovereignty and its 
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alleged (by the standard narrative of modern European constitutionalism) categorical 
difference with the institution of government ( cf Tuck 2016). 
 
1. Beyond Conventionalism: A Cultural Take on Social Practices 
 
Before proceeding to the analysis of the role of the courts and then of central banks in 
contemporary constitutionalism, a brief summary of the main tenets of a cultural study of law 
is in order. In the version elaborated and developed by Paul Kahn (1997; 1999), the cultural 
study of law offers a refreshing angle through which one can observe the life of the law. The 
legal order is understood and observed as a social practice, but unlike legal positivist 
conceptions of social practices, Kahn’s cultural approach presents them as worlds which can 
be reconstructed by observation (from within or from without) through thick descriptions 
(Geertz 1973). While for the legal positivist these practices are often a question of rule-
following, for the cultural study of law legal practices come across as constitutive and 
supportive of webs of meaning whose depth and width those rules alone cannot exhaust nor 
explain away: ‘these social practices are somewhat like games, in that they have rules and 
expected customs of behaviour that are the product of community’s history’ (Kahn 1999, 35). 
The problem with the positivist reconstruction of these practices is that they are often 
reduced to common agreement, that is, to a (social or legal) convention. This is probably the 
dominant approach among legal positivists (classic reference, now, goes to Marmor 2008) 
but, as a theoretical solution, this remains subject to issues of infinite regression.1 In fact, 
social practices make sense as long as they are nested in a world of meaning.  Therefore, the 
cultural study of law elaborates the structure of the imaginative possibilities of worlds of 
social and legal meanings. Here lies a key difference between a conventionalist and a cultural 
view of social practices. Both adopt an internal point of view in order to explain the 
emergence of the legal order, but their horizon of reference differs in a very significant way. 
In brief, a cultural study of law (which is a social practice in itself, as Kahn often reminds us) 
goes beyond the idea that a social practice is a set of prescribed actions: ‘it is the way of 
understanding self and others that makes actions meaningful’ (Kahn 1999, 37). According to 
                                                     
1 Marmor’s work is illustrative of this issue: in Social Conventions he feels compelled to introduce the distinction 
between deep and surface conventions, but this move does not avoid the problem of the infinite regress. In fact, 
what grounds deep conventions? Another deeper and more fundamental convention? 
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Kahn, it is impossible to separate action and belief when describing a social practice as ‘every 
action rests on some set of beliefs; every belief makes possible a range of actions’ (ibid.). By 
looking at these reasons, one can understand why Kahn places so much emphasis on sacrifice: 
it is only though the exposition of the body to the marks (or, better, scars) of faith and belief 
that the symbolic forms of the constitutional order are substantiated and made explicit.2 The 
constitution requires this commitment in order to be made meaningful. 
The conventionalist inquiry reconstructs authority as a matter of agreed convergence of 
officials or people upon a shared activity. Ultimately (and this is why it is a conception of the 
legal order with an enormous appeal), the dispute is about what a convention is. The 
possibility of grounding the legal order over a convention allows the theorist to avoid 
questions of meaning and substance. Often, the outcome is that a social practice counts as a 
convention (as a constitutive one, to be more accurate) if there is an undergirding social 
consensus (e.g. Searle 1995). Opposite to that, the cultural study of law reconstructs authority 
as a matter of self-knowledge and self-understanding. For this reason, studying the law from 
a cultural perspective entails the reconstruction of the conceptual conditions that make 
possible the emergence of a social practice. Kahn, following Foucault, speaks of the ‘historical 
a-priori’: what are the conditions that make possible the emergence of a certain practice? 
Those conditions cannot be known in abstract but only by bounding the inquiry to particular 
examples of the social practice.3  This is a powerful tool in the hands of the legal analysist 
because it immunises from undue generalisations such as the one René Girard’s theory of the 
scapegoat (Girard 1989) seems to be exposed to.4  
Yet, like the conventionalist picture of social practices, even this presentation of the cultural 
approach might concede too much to (1) a pacified convergence upon structures and (2) an 
intimate link between social practices grounding constitutional orders and the logic of 
sacrifice. It is important to remind that the historical a-priori is not a given semantic, but that 
its historical pedigree resonates with the idea of unlimited contingencies. A social practice, 
                                                     
2 It is not completely clear whether Kahn admits of a symbolic form achieved by a sacrificial action that does not 
require to put the body on the line, but only the giving up to something without a contractual obligation (e.g., 
sacrifice in an economic sense as in the jargon of austerity). 
3 Of course the general level of inquiring is unavoidable: Kahn notes, for example, that ‘we need to investigate 
the shape of legal space and time generally before we inquire into particular kinds of space and time’ (Kahn 
1999, 37). 
4 As known, Girard has reconstructed the development of modern civilisation as a history of the progressive 
effects of scapegoating, which would find its pinnacle with Christianity.  
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by definition, could have always been something else. In brief: the social practice could have 
taken up a different form. I do not dispute that this nuance cannot be addressed by the 
cultural approach to legal studies. To the contrary: within a cultural perspective there is a 
remarkable quantity of intellectual resources available for tackling this issue. There is also a 
shared assumption with a phenomenological approach: the reduction of complexity is a 
precondition for the creation of meaning. However, this position is exposed to two risks. The 
first one consists in universalising the politico-theological underpinnings of the cultural 
reading of constitutional orders, which would mean to make sacrifice and its logic necessary 
elements of each and every order and not just contextual outcomes of a particular and 
concrete set of circumstances. The other risk, closely linked to the former, is to conceive of 
acts of world-building as truly exceptional. To the contrary, the idea proposed here, is to 
enquiry into the systems of meaning of each and every constitutional order without taking 
for granted that there is a common anthropological structure underpinning them (i.e., 
sacrifice might be the way to understand how constitutional orders are created and 
maintained, but there is nothing necessary about it). Moreover, the proposal here is to think 
the exception as functional to the construction and preservation of normality, rather than a 
moment of revelation. Following Schmitt, the exception is often assumed to give meaning to 
the rule (see, for a general reconstruction of this topic, Kahn 2011). However, one can 
conceive a cultural study of law rather focussed on the ordering qualities of normality. The 
exceptionality of certain practices or actions should be read as entirely functional to the 
consolidation of a social semantic of normality. This is what I intend to discuss in the next 
section with reference to the charismatic function allegedly played by judges. In the following 
section, then, I will try to extend these insights to the analysis of the charismatic function of 
the European Central Bank in the Eurozone. 
 
 
2. Charisma and Rituals 
 
One of the great insights of a cultural study of law lies in its capacity of understanding the 
boundaries of the legal imagination. In societies based on the recognition that the law is 
sovereign, the legal imagination extends its grip into a series of cultural artefacts that are not 
immediately associated to the administration of the law. For example, Kahn has shown in a 
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powerful way how much the legal imagination can pervade the production and realisation of 
contemporary movies (Kahn 2013).     
However, not all the observed practices and institutions do play the same function within the 
legal imagination. The ability to draw a distinction between the roles of different institutions 
or objects is actually a dividend of a cultural understanding of the constitutional order. We 
might look at movies, novels, arts as representations of our identities and our way of seeing 
the world through law. These creations, as temporally and spatially defined processes of 
production, do work as narrative devices for telling over and over who we are. They also work 
as myth-making machines: their symbolism sustains a whole web of meanings without which 
the context of one’s life would remain unintelligible. They also enhance and celebrate the 
point of the practice and therefore they operate as learning devices. By observing the 
representation of how the political and constitutional order comes about (which might be 
contained or hinted at only in partial and underdeveloped ways, as it is the case for the end 
of Cormac MacCarthy’s The Road [Kahn 2013, 134-5], where the reconstitution of family is 
celebrated as the rebirth of political community), we learn about it. Yet, the fruition of these 
objects, as helpful as it might be in strengthening the ordering properties of a certain 
imagination, does not require us to identify fully with them. To resort to Kahn’s language, a 
movie is not supposed to persuade us that we are the authors of our legal order. If it works, 
it might simply remind us what the main tenets of our constitutional imagination are. By 
inquiring into the structures of meaning of the movie one can retrieve the boundaries of the 
constitutional imagination which make the actions represented in the movie intelligible. 
This is the specific difference marking out certain institutions and certainly the Supreme Court 
(at least in the US):5 to persuade citizens that they are the authors of a constitutional order 
ruled by law. It is important to note that persuasion is driven by the function of upholding 
popular sovereignty because in the US constitutional order, the founding belief is based on 
the idea that the ‘law is king’ and the people are sovereign (Kahn 1997, 47-50). Kahn 
introduces the theme after a discussion of Marbury v Madison. His point is that this seminal 
case does not contain enough textual resources to explain why it has become the 
                                                     
5 It is not entirely clear to me whether Kahn’s argument concerns only the Supreme Court or it can be extended 
to the whole of the judiciary. In light of the structure of the US judiciary and given his constant references to 
courts and judges, I tend to think that the charismatic function is played out by all courts within the judicial 
system. Yet, the book discusses only Supreme Court case law. 
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foundational case in US constitutional history. In other words, why a decision expressed in 
rather dry legal reasoning has been able to bootstrap judicial review in the US legal order?  
Kahn rehearses here a relatively well-known argument about constitutional review. The 
connection is between the constitutional identity of the people and its mirroring into the 
adjudicative process of reviewing the constitutionality of ordinary law. The connection 
between identity and institutions was already present to the Enlightenment generation. Both 
in the US and in France, at the time of their revolutions, the theme of the renewal of the 
institution as the consolidation of identity is quite common. For example, Sieyes’ project for 
a constitutional jury (which was rejected during Thermidor) contains a reference to the 
undergirding constitutional identity through the periodical renewal of a fraction of its 
members (Goldoni 2012). In the case of the Supreme Court, this is even more evident as the 
appointment process requires a solid majority in the Senate and it entails, once confirmed, a 
life-long tenure. The temporality of the judicial office transcends the electoral process and 
invites to connect the composition of the Supreme Court to the identity of the American 
people conceived as an intergenerational process. Kahn reads into this peculiar feature of the 
American Supreme Court the symbolic mark of sacrifice: Justices give themselves up to the 
Constitution when their appointment is confirmed. Along the same lines, Bruce Ackerman 
(1991, ch 6) has also attributed to the Supreme Court the task of the intergenerational 
synthesis between different constitutional moments, that is, between fundamental changes 
in the constitutional identity of the people.6 The function of the Supreme Court is to tie 
different constitutional moments in one coherent narrative and offer, in this way, a mirror to 
the sovereign people. 
According to Kahn, Marbury was able to introduce a crucial novelty (a new beginning for legal 
doctrine, as in the language of the book) such as the judicial review of ordinary law because 
it persuaded the people that the opinion had been written by the authors of the law: the 
people themselves. But how the persuasion is supposed to work? This is an unavoidable 
question as a lot is placed upon the persuasive rhetoric deployed by the Court, given the 
recognition that even transformative judgments are usually contested by dissenting opinions.  
                                                     
6 Kahn believes that Ackerman’s project is doomed to fail because it tries to rationalise charisma by obtaining a 
synthesis between reason and will (Kahn 2004, 256-7). 
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Kahn spends at least two long chapters carefully reconstructing how and what makes an 
opinion persuasive. But in line with the cultural study of law, he examines also the conditions 
which make possible the ‘performative success’ of an authorial judgment by the court. The 
answer is that the narrative offered by the Court has to speak with ‘the fullness of charismatic 
presence’ (Kahn 2016, 84). Charisma is here employed in a politico-theological sense as that 
which ‘stands between the sacred and the profane’ (Kahn 2016, 84). Charismatic presence 
performs an intermediation function: it renews the belief that the source of law bears the 
mark of the sacred. As known, Kahn believes that (at least for the US experience), the mark 
of the sacred is a way to remember the sacrifice behind the enactment of the Constitution 
and of the other sacrifices (like those of the Civil War) which drove major constitutional 
changes in the history of the US. In this way, the puzzle of the composition of the rule of law 
and popular sovereignty is apparently solved: to live according to the principle of sovereignty 
is to live under the law (under the condition that the law is self-authored in the peculiar 
meaning given by Kahn to the expression). The authorship of popular sovereignty carries the 
weight of the legitimacy of an opinion as long as the latter can support that particular belief. 
Otherwise, in the absence of an appropriate faith, ‘following the law can become a hollow 
ritual’ (Kahn 2016, 85). The latter statement means that a constitutional order without the 
support of an appropriate faith is built on quicksand. 
In light of the previous remarks, it is clear that there is no rulebook of charismatic behaviour. 
The charismatic function, it is noted, is enacted rather than represented. Apparently, its 
success cannot be measured according to criteria of justice or correctness (i.e., whether a 
ruling is a correct or wrong decision). The success of an opinion is performative: if it persuades 
the people that they are its ultimate author, then it can be deemed to be a charismatic 
achievement obtained by making the sovereign present.  
But how can we judge the success of a performative? The ritualistic and belief-making 
elements of the practice are highlighted several times by Kahn. Reason – we are told – cannot 
fully determine the content of practices and beliefs. At the end of the day, this is a 
reconstruction heavily indebted to negative theology: ‘if this all seems mysterious, it is 
because it is. It is a matter of faith and belief, of rituals that maintain that faith, and of rhetoric 
that gives it expression’ (Kahn 2016, 86). It seems we are back to the difficulties that affected 
Austin’s conventionalist reconstruction of performatives. While insisting on the conventional 
nature of performative acts, he was forced to recognise that ‘it is difficult to say where 
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conventions begin and end’ (Austin 1962, 118). In fact, not even institutional events can be 
made real by a performative act, as it remains impossible to separate them from facts, or to 
use Austin’s terminology, the illocutionary and perlocutionary moments of the speech act.7 
At times, Kahn seems to concede the same point for the validity of rituals as if their 
performativity were to be a matter of magic rather than practices involved in the production 
of normality.8  
 However, despite this almost mystical closure of discourse about the grounds of ritual 
practices, Kahn does not stop there: in fact, chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to illustrate how 
persuasion can work in the US constitutional culture. In other words, within the possibilities 
of a historical a priori, a series of narrative devices are analysed in order to offer a 
classification of the possible narrative moves available to the Court. Moreover, a couple of 
cases in chapter 2 are discussed as instances of Supreme Court’s failures in persuading the 
American people that its decisions were their (of the people) law. Bush v Gore is flagged up 
as the paradigmatic instantiation of a failed attempt at persuasion. Note that Kahn’s remarks 
on the case are not limited to a sociological recognition of the failure of the decision and, 
more specifically, the opinion. Bush v Gore might not have been recognised as belonging to 
the constitutional canon by US constitutional lawyers, but the reaction of the institutions was 
not comparable to the one of Lincoln before Dred Scott. Moreover, Kahn notes that the Court 
could have adopted at least three different narratives and its failure is due to its inability to 
speak with the voice of the sovereign.  
Yet, at the end of this dense chapter, we are reminded that to understand the reverence for 
law in the American imagination sheds a revealing light upon ‘the exceptional nature of the 
judicial opinion’ (Kahn 2016, 86). Reverence for law is what supports the connection between 
the sacred and the profane and what makes the Justice a bearer of sovereignty rather than a 
mere lawyer. The gift of experiencing the opinion of the Justice can be received only by those 
who are still in the grip of the sovereign presence. 
                                                     
7 The cultural study of law is less opened to this type of criticism as, unlike conventionalism, it would still require 
a shared understanding which is not reducible to the conventionalist agreement. For the cultural study of law, 
performatives are effective only as long as they are supported by shared understanding among concrete forms 
of life. 
8 For example, discussing Marbury he notes that it ‘can be likened to a great magic act. The trick of the opinion 
is to make its drafter disappear, leaving us staring at the Constitution- or more accurately, persuading us that 
we are staring at the Constitution’ (Kahn 2016, 70). 
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Kahn’s text, however, invites also a potentially alternative reading which might not need to 
establish a close connection with the sacred and the exceptional: ‘Courts persuade us of their 
access to [..] truth not by logic but by the rituals and beliefs that go into the production of the 
opinion… We need to read the opinion as it shows itself in our social practices, which begin 
with the judicial rite of passage that is the confirmation process, continue in the symbolism 
of the courtroom, and then bring forth the opinion that takes us from the position of reader 
[…] to that of author’. (Kahn 2016, 85). Beliefs and faith are taken to be the supporting 
elements of this specific social practice. But its ritualistic tenets might suggest a reading that 
does not rest on the grounds of sovereignty and its exceptionalist understanding. 
Schmitt’s development of the concept of sovereignty, while clearly located on the 
exceptionalist side, betrays also an anxiety for the creation of normality.9 Legality cannot rest 
on a norm because every general norm demands a normal, everyday frame of life given that 
there is no norm applicable to chaos. In fact, sovereignty has to guarantee the ‘totality of the 
situation’. The exception has to be managed and made productive for the ordering properties 
of the institutions.10 The ritual of the Justice’s confirmation, for example, can be seen as the 
‘signal of an order of law, not politics, for those who are present’ (Kahn 2016, 64). If it works 
(meaning: if it is not received by sheer indifference), it symbolically establishes the 
constitutional function of the Justice. Exceptional attributes are given to the Justice and its 
functional role is actually buried (and made invisible – Kahn rightly notes that the narratives 
adopted by the Supreme Court are often replete with the dynamics of seeing/not seeing). 
Catherine Bell, in her study on ritual practices, has called this work of separation and 
distinction ‘ritualization’, suggesting in a rather convincing way that the basic moment in 
rituals should be sought, more than in their content, in the need to fix a boundary and to mark 
a difference (Bell 1992, 74): ‘I will use the term “ritualization” to draw attention to the way in 
which certain social actions strategically distinguish themselves in relation to other actions 
[…] As such, ritualization is a matter of various culturally specific activities, for [..] creating and 
privileging a qualitative distinction between the sacred and the profane’. All of this resonates 
clearly with Kahn’s interpretation of the judicial role. But to avoid any misunderstanding, it 
should be immediately added that a ritual must be able to constitute a model, or more 
                                                     
9 For this reading, see Croce & Salvatore 2013. 
10 This discourse is translated, in the late Schmitt, into a geopolitical meditation on the role of the line and the 
importance of qualifying the extra-European space as the one ‘beyond the line’: Schmitt 2006. 
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exactly, a paradigm for ordinary practices. Separation does not entail absence of connection. 
After all, a total separation between the sacred and the profane would make the ritual, whose 
task is to stabilize the social order, totally ineffective. If the bridge between the sacred and 
the profane is stretched too far, the ritual will lose traction precisely because it won’t be able 
to function as an ordering paradigm (De Carolis 2018, 67). This is quite a common risk for 
those writing in the tradition of political theology because they are usually prone to take at 
face value the distinction between sovereignty and government.11  
Is the ritual then something close to an anthropological universal? Or are functional 
equivalents available? This is a difficult question to answer, although many studies highlight 
the presence of some form of ritual in every observed society (Rappaport 1999); yet, the 
question has not been settled and cannot be addressed here.12 The point to bring home is 
that the ritual of judging is certainly understandable only within ‘our social practices’ but this 
is because it is partially constitutive of their normality. The production of normality is the 
point of the ritual: limiting the disruptive effects of the openness to absolute contingency. In 
fact, the ritual of judging contains the risk that communicating the order might display its 
conventionality, ‘revealing the incontrovertible truth that everything that can be said can 
equally be negated’ (De Carolis 2018, 65). In this way, the opinion of the Court (this opinion, 
these judges) is translated into the voice of the sovereign people. Kahn is right to note that 
only the exceptional gift of delivering the opinion is a sign of contact with the sacred. 
However, it should be added that this cannot be obtained at the cost of losing contact with 
the ordinary. Maintaining the connection between the sacred and the ordinary is not a work 
of magic or miraculous action, but the construction of a normality that cannot be separated 
from ordinary practices. Therefore, charisma does not belong fully to the exceptional 
dimension, but works as a bridge between the ordinary and the sacred.13 
 
3. The Austere Charisma of the European Central Bank 
 
                                                     
11 See section 4. 
12 But see, for a nuanced treatment, Burkert 1998. 
13 For the sake of clarity, it should be added that Kahn does not disagree with this statement, but only with the 
implication that the bridge does not need to be built by sacrificial materials: Kahn 2004, 252-4. 
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What is the potential of the idea of charismatic authority when studied from the cultural 
perspective? It is certainly remarkable, in particular for constitutional studies. One wonders, 
for example, whether the authority of the President of the United States is a matter of 
charisma or, to put it in different terms, whether it is the office or the person who makes it 
charismatic. In the case of courts, it seems to be the office rather than the person. Perhaps 
for political institutions the question remains more controversial. Kahn has often discussed in 
his works the speeches and the actions of key figures of American constitutional history. For 
example, Lincoln is often presented as the epitome of a figure who does not just represent 
but embody the voice of the people. It would be interesting here to compare the charismatic 
role of the judiciary with the politically charged charismatic role of the President. Should the 
difference be seen in the different modalities of potential self-sacrifice? The President literally 
embodies sovereignty exposing itself to the risk of being murdered while the Justices simply 
take up a new persona by an oath for life.  
Or is the difference given by the modalities of delivering the voice? Prophecy is at times the 
transmission belt of the sovereign voice which challenges the status quo and it seems to be a 
common modality of the transformative presidencies (Skowronek 1993) while the Supreme 
Court seems to be more concerned in relating the sovereign voice to temporal continuity, 
that is, past, present and future (transformation is then portrayed as renewal).14 
Be that as it may, the idea of charismatic institutions has a wider comparative potential (as 
noted by Berger 2017). It can teach us many things about the nature and roles of other 
institutions in different constitutional orders. This is indeed one of the greatest dividends of 
the cultural study of law. Kahn is adamant in stating that there is no equivalent to the 
American experience among European Union courts as there is no equivalent in the EU to the 
sacrificial ethos of American constitutionalism.15 This is probably an accurate judgment 
(although the initial constituent force of the European Court of Justice should not be 
underestimated), but I believe that a cultural study of the European Union legal order would 
probably locate, today, the charismatic institution (if there is any) in the European Central 
Bank (ECB).16 The Euro crisis, and the reaction that followed it, showed that the European 
                                                     
14 Though, again, Kahn is very keen in stressing the role of Lincoln in crafting a political rhetoric which ‘links each 
generation to its predecessors and ultimately to the revolutionary origins of the nation in a collective threat of 
political martyrdom’ (Kahn 2004, 244). 
15 For an interesting analysis of European identity as portrayed in cinema see Everett 2005. 
16 For a cultural study of EU integration see Haltern 2004. 
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Central Bank had both the institutional capital for action and, at the same time, a reserve of 
credibility towards politicians and (some sections of) the European peoples. Clearly, the 
European Central Bank does not work as a connector between the sacred and the profane by 
resorting to the language of political sacrifice (understood, as noted before, as the potential 
for killing or being killed) but it still operates as the symbolic mediator of an attempt at 
building European identity around the common currency. An analysis of the ECB and its 
constitutional relations within the wider EU legal order shows that the institution has 
represented itself as the guardian of the core monetary constitution upon which political 
unity is supposed to be accordingly expanded (cf Chessa 2016). As known, the story of the 
Euro as an instrument (at times, the main instrument) of integration dates back to a quite 
distant time by now. Attempts to root the Euro into European history have made sure to 
embed it within the epic narrative of European integration. Observers have pointed out that 
the monetary union is not the first experiment of a single currency zone in Europe (Mourlon-
Druol 2012). Most importantly, the common currency has become the symbolic centre of 
Europe as consisting of a moral fabric whose centre of gravity is a culture of stability. The 
latter is functional to the introduction of a new constituency within the European 
constitutional order: the Marktvolk (Streeck 2014, 79-81). In other words, the constitutional 
order of the EU is not only addressed to the Member States’ citizens, but to a series of markets 
(financial and non-financial as well) whose dictates influence strongly EU initiatives. Hence, 
as Streeck has noted, the EU addresses the concerns of its citizens by pleasing markets and 
transforming social integration into market integration. As we shall see, this implies that the 
ECB has first of all to persuade markets and, if successful in doing this, it will be able to 
persuade citizens as well.  
This novelty is coupled with the transformation of the European state from a fiscal to a debt 
state. As known, in the former case political representation is rooted in the State’s capacity 
to collect taxes while in the latter the state becomes responsible before markets for its 
capacity to persuade them of the financial solidity of its public debt. These constitutional and 
political transformations have paved the way to introduce the currency as the framing device 
for governing (see Lazzarato 2015, 177-212). In fact, the preservation of the currency (which, 
according to the mainstream narrative, allows Member States to fund themselves on financial 
markets) requires certain sacrifices from citizens in order to rationalise public expenses. 
Solidarity is therefore substituted by an ethic of austerity whose core is a demand to European 
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citizens to live with less means (Blyth 2012). As put by a commentator before the inception 
of the currency, ‘the euro is ... not just a currency but a meaning. However, this meaning will 
not be built solely by means of financial messages but will also take shape through narrative 
[…] it is therefore a mistake to tell people that what they will be sharing is only a currency; 
they have to be persuaded that the European integration process means sharing something 
more’ (Perez 1999, 140). This is very close to attributing a sacred symbolic status to the 
currency. The constitutional translation of this status can be seen in the remarkable forms of 
autonomy and independence conceded to the ECB, an institution with the complete 
monopoly of control over the common currency.17 The constitutional doctrine of central bank 
independence lies at the core of the Euro as a form of government because it detaches fiscal 
policies from monetary policies and in this way affects the basis for political representation. 
The separation of monetary from fiscal policies allows the ECB to become the guardian (if not 
the priest) of the culture of stability within the Eurozone because it allegedly insulates the 
managing of prices from short-term driven political interests. The institution itself, through 
its own legal office, has even capitalized on its outstanding independence status by claiming 
that the ECB is an autonomous ‘constitutional order’ within the EU (see, paradigmatically, the 
OLAF case and Zilioli & Selmayr 2001) and, accordingly, not subject to ordinary forms of 
political or legal accountability.  
The Euro crisis, which soon affected both States’ public debts and national banking systems, 
exposed the contradictions of the design of the common currency. The Euro is built on 
quicksand, as it is not tied to any form of common taxation,18 and it is not deemed to be an 
optimum currency area. Nonetheless, it is the second strongest currency at the global level 
and even in the darkest moments of the crisis, where the consensus for the common currency 
would shrink visibly, it would never go below the level of simple majority (and this was the 
case even for Greece). Given the devastation brought about by the governing mechanisms 
associated to the common currency (e.g., the pact of growth and stability, the European 
Stability Mechanism, the Fiscal compact),19 support for the Euro has never been seriously 
weak. It was also quite revealing to see how many key figures of EU politics (Merkel, but also 
                                                     
17 Though, given its composition, it is debatable how much influence is exercised by national central banks. 
18 On the constitutive link between centralised fiscal power and the rise of State money see Desan 2017. 
19 For a reflection on how the measures adopted to manage the crisis changed the constitutional balance of the 
EU see Dawson, De Witte 2013. 
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Sarkozy as well)20 stated openly that the collapse of the Euro would be equivalent to the end 
of the EU.21 In other words, important components of the political imagination in the EU could 
not conceive of a Union without the common currency. This is reflected even in the Treaties. 
As known, there is a dedicated article for Member States with the intention of exiting the 
Union (art. 50 TEU, as used in Brexit), but there is no procedure to exit the Euro. This is 
because the ‘myth’ of the irreversibility of the Euro is a constitutive factor of the current EU 
constitutional imagination (Wilkinson 2015). 
The ECB has become the mediating institution in the ritual of monetary policy and in 
exercising this role it has become the guardian of EU stability. Such a task has long gone 
beyond the control and review of the inflation rate and it has now expanded to a point that 
includes the publication of its reports and its executive boards’ meetings as instruments of 
persuasion directed clearly at markets first and only secondarily to citizens. It would have 
been impossible to imagine, 20 years ago, something similar to what Mario Draghi (the 
current President of the ECB) did in the midst of the Euro crisis in September 2012. In a rather 
Schmittian vein, during a press conference following a governing board meeting, he stated 
that ‘we (the ECB) will do whatever it takes to save the Euro’, and then added immediately: 
‘and, believe me, it will be enough’. Through this statement, the ECB declared that it was 
ready to purchase on secondary markets government bonds issued by States of the euro area, 
subject to certain conditions which included, first, that the concerned states had to be subject 
to financial assistance, by either the EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility) or the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Second, no quantitative limits for the amount of 
purchases of these bonds were announced. Third, the ECB would act in the same way as any 
private creditors and therefore would not benefit from a special status as public actor. 
Following the announcement, the volatility of the interest rates paced down, and until today, 
the OMT programme has never been activated, and the programme itself has now been 
overcome by forms of ‘quantitative easing’, a staggering 60 billion euros per month 
                                                     
20 Sarkozy was very vocal during the euro crisis and established a clear connection between the common 
currency and peace. He tapped into a well-established narrative about the historical meaning of European 
integration, warning that the implications of a failure of the euro would be unimaginable and earth-shaking. 
Those referring to the end of the Euro are oblivious of Europe’s past of “barbaric” wars. 
21 As I am writing, the President of the Italian republic has just denied the appointment of a minister in the new 
government because of the constitutional commitment of Italy to remain in the EU. Given that the minister in 
question had doubts only about Italy’s membership in the Euro, I assume that the President has also equated 
membership in the Euro with permanence in the EU. 
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programme in which it buys government bonds on the secondary markets. Part of the novelty 
of these claims has to be seen not only in the series of unconventional measures (Outright 
Monetary Transactions Programme, Quantitative Easing) adopted by the Governing Council 
of the ECB, but also in the fact that acts of communication (performative acts) such as the 
press conference just mentioned would become the subject of judicial review by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU). But in this case, the act under scrutiny was an informal 
act of the ECB which announced an unconventional (i.e.: not foreseen explicitly by the 
Treaties) programme for supporting the Member States’ public debts which would come 
under speculative attack. In Gauweiler (C-62/14, June 2015), the CJEU took up another 
confrontation with the German Constitutional Court and addressed the latter’s doubt about 
the legality of the ECB’s intervention (in particular in violation of article 123 and 126 TFEU). 
Interestingly, the Court used proportionality analysis as the main methodology to address the 
question of the illegality of the OMT programme. In accordance with the Advocate General’s 
advice, the CJEU acknowledged that because the ECB is supposed ‘to make choices of a 
technical nature and to undertake forecasts and complex assessments, it must be allowed, in 
that context, a broad discretion’. The question, at this stage, obviously concerns how to 
harness such discretion in a way which remains compatible with the rule of law. The CJEU 
suggests a procedural test of proportionality in order to check the legality of the ECB’s 
discretion. As for what concerns the suitability step of proportionality review, the Court held 
that ‘it does not appear that that analysis of the economic situation of the euro area is vitiated 
by a manifest error of assessment’.22 The point of technical expertise is again conjured up at 
this point: ‘given that questions of monetary policy are usually of a controversial nature and 
in view of the ESCB’s broad discretion, nothing more can be required of the ESCB apart from 
that it uses its economic expertise and the necessary technical means at its disposal to carry 
out that analysis with all care and accuracy’.23 As for the second step of proportionality 
review, the necessity of the OMT programme, the CJEU ruled the action of the ECB did ‘not 
go manifestly beyond what is necessary to achieve its objectives’. The ECB had the expertise 
to decide if and when a bond-buying programme may prove necessary in order to avoid the 
disruption of the monetary policy transmission. However, given that it is impossible to 
                                                     
22 C-62/14 (Gauweiler) Para 74. 
23 Para 75. 
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establish in advance how long will it take to support a Member State’s bonds on the markets, 
it seems that the necessity of the programme and the absence of possible alternatives have 
not been fully appreciated by the CJEU. Clearly, the Court has recognised an enormous margin 
of discretion to the ECB as the ultimate guardian of the stability of the Eurozone and, as such, 
of the stability of the European Union. The complexity of monetary policies can be addressed 
only by an institution acting according to a logic that, upon closer scrutiny, is everything, but 
inspired by proportionality. Rather, in the language used by Draghi (‘whatever it takes’) one 
can hear echoes of sovereign power. The controversial actions undertaken by Draghi and the 
ECB seem to have achieved what they intended to obtain: preserving the stability of the 
Eurozone and, hence, ensuring the preservation of the EU constitutional order. This has had 
consequences (of legal and political nature) that go well beyond the concerns of financial 
markets and the banking system. Of course, the actions of the ECB did not go uncontested 
(though, fundamentally, they were challenged only twice) and for this reason the ECJ was 
brought into the picture in order to bestow a veneer of legality on its unconventional policies. 
Remarkably, the legal reasoning of the Luxembourg Court was very thin (given its importance, 
the judgment is really short and the proportionality test openly underdeveloped) and prone 
to concede to the ECB an enormous amount of discretion. The latter point cannot be 
underestimated: the independence of the ECB was initially justified by its expertise and the 
idea that the governance of the Euro was rule-based (hence, inviting no discretion); in this 
judgment, the Court has simply rubber-stamped the Bank’s self-redefinition and has taken as 
one of the measures of the validity of the ECB’s move the fact that markets were persuaded 
and speculation calmed down. At this point, it is possible to identify the relevant difference 
with Kahn’s reconstruction of the US Supreme Court rule: in the case of the EU, the persuasion 
is a matter of output realisation and the performative success of a charismatic action is given 
not by a sense of shared ‘authorship’ among citizens, but by a response of markets which is 
compatible with the dominant culture of stability. 
Although discourses on the link between the currency and European identity have often been 
shifting across three different types of identity (ethnic, civic and cultural), the ECB has 
increasingly presented itself as the guardian of that link (see Tognato 2012). Such an effort 
has been conducted with all available means, legal and extra-legal. The capacity of the ECB of 
mobilising those different instruments and get away with it (although, of course, facing severe 
criticism at the same time) seems to confirm that, in times of crisis and emergency, this has 
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been the most authoritative and charismatic institution within the EU. The ECB has made sure 
that the governance of the common currency would be turned into a morality play inspired 
by austerity and stability. To resort to the terms used in the previous sections, this move has 
made sure that even exceptions would be integrated into normality.24 In fact, Draghi’s famous 
statement has not amounted to a constitutional change of the Eurozone order. More 
accurately, Draghi’s intervention is a borderline legal intervention in support of the existing 
Eurozone material constitution. Its purpose was to save and preserve a culture of stability and 
austerity. As such, the constitutional meaning of Draghi’s intervention was completely within 
the already constituted horizon of financial stability.  
However, the linkage between currency and collective identity remains an extremely 
contingent cultural achievement. As such, it needs to happen on a systematic basis in order 
to produce sustained institutional and social effects. Since this has not been the case in 
European monetary affairs, ‘the transubstantion of the euro into a matter of European 
identity has been cursory at best’ (Tognato 2012, 101). What is clear, at this point, is that the 
ECB cannot afford to adopt unconventional decisions which would be ineffective and 
unpersuasive as Bush v Gore was. In the Euro-zone, persuasion works also according to how 
it is performed, not only by whom. This might include more informal interventions, such as 
press conferences, press releases, interviews and more formal interaction with other 
instituitons, such as appearances before the European Parliament or some national 
parliaments in order to build political consensus for the Bank’s approach to financial stability. 
Yet, the current wave of anti-European political movements and parties that is threatening 
the EU stability is the proof that the ECB’s achievement is not as solid as it might appear in 
the first place. 
 
4. Central Banking between Sovereignty and Government 
 
The cultural study of law can give us important insights on the features of essential 
institutions of a constitutional order. But it is important to be aware of the type of logic that 
lies behind the formation and development of a constitutional culture. Kahn has aptly 
                                                     
24 For a different account which puts emphasis on the use of emergency powers to transform the constitutional 
essentials of the EU see White 2015. 
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reconstructed the conditions which make possible the emergence of a certain constitutional 
imagination. Perhaps, he is right in identifying in the sacrificial logic the ground of American 
constitutionalism. Sacrificial logic might explain better than conventionalism or social 
contract how constitutional orders hold together. The logic of conventionalism and 
contractualism is one of sheer reciprocity. Kahn notes that this type of logic cannot glue 
together two fundamental institutions: family and political community (Kahn 2008, 98-9). 
Only the willingness to self-transcend oneself (to self-sacrifice) can give material form to the 
constitution.25 However, it is not clear whether the import of such logic into the constitutional 
order can be read in fully exceptionalist terms. Actually, it seems possible to reverse the order 
of that reading and to harness the cultural study to an understanding whose main concerns 
are normality and its ordering properties. Within this view, it would still be possible to ask 
citizens some form of sacrifice, but this should not be tied to an exceptional moment. The 
construction of austerity as the morality play which breathes life into the EU constitutional 
order illustrates this possibility rather eloquently. If this is the case, then the radical split that 
it is usually postulated between sovereignty and government (very palpable in Schmitt’s 
work) has to be rejected. As noted by De Carolis (2018, 72): ‘The split, which is a result of the 
modern order and its way of representing itself, was taken as an actual premise, almost as if 
the actual social systems, the forms of life, and the concrete modalities of administering 
power contributed only marginally to the stability of the legal order’. 
The case of the ECB shows how enriching this different viewpoint can be. Although it acted 
apparently without a clear sense of constitutional limit, the ECB’s intervention cannot really 
be described as an act of a Schmittian sovereign, but rather as an authoritative constitutional 
actor which uses extraordinary (or, better, unconventional) means within an already 
constituted imaginary. Its claim to disproportionate intervention and its request of sacrificing 
citizens’ well-being (through austerity) resonate with sovereign echoes. Yet, one would miss 
the point if the ECB intervention was to be seen as truly exceptional, that is, as an 
extraordinary action that grounds the EU constitutional order. Its charisma plays out in the 
ritualistic uses of its alleged epistemic advantage and its capacity to maintain order and 
stability. A form of life is then shaped by this set up in virtue of the assumption that the social 
order would be shattered by the fall of the common currency. Faced with potentially 
                                                     
25 A similar argument has been recently defended by Eagleton 2018. 
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unsettling contradictions to deal with, the President of the ECB decided to mobilise 
unconventional and possibly illegal resources to preserve (and not to create) a culture of 
stability and austerity.  
By looking at the role of the ECB in the EU it is also possible to appreciate the richness of the 
cultural study of law. Other approaches would not be able to take into account what are, 
legally speaking, irrelevant forms of intervention. To the contrary, crucial for the 
understanding of the role of the ECB is to study how it operates in interaction with markets 
and other EU institutions in order to persuade both of the efficacy of its decisions. Clearly, in 
order to appreciate its power, one has to recognise that other jurisgenerative forces beyond 
the citizens’ willingness to sacrifice itself for the constitution can be mobilised. Under certain 
material conditions (certain legal instruments, a specific organisation of the political 
economy) and beliefs (the importance of financial stability for the constitutional order and 
the integrative force of the common currency), other forms of charismatic authority can be 
generated and employed in order to support a constitutional order. There is nothing, in the 
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